Since the early 1980s, countries worldwide have implemented electricity sector reforms, unbundling the generation, transmission, distribution, and supply activities, aiming at introducing competition in generation and supply. The monopolistic activities have not been left aside. Some countries have adopted incentive benchmark regulation to promote efficiency improvement in those activities, particularly in distribution [2] , [3] .
Incremental and Marginal Costs: The paper formulates a distribution pricing method that is based on incremental costs derived from the aggregated expansion plan of a particular utility, named "model utility." The employment of incremental costs for the evaluation of alternative investment plans is widely accepted. It strictly interprets the term "marginal" as a derivative of cost with respect to demand; the usual practice is to use years as the time increment.
The incremental cost is sensitive to the achieved investments, but remains constant for the load and cost changes in the time increment. Thus, the incremental cost does not reflect the economies associated with investment delays due to a reduction in demand growth. How do the authors approach this drawback in the proposed model?
Distribution Expansion Planning: The determination of the costs associated with the primary elemental distribution system (PEDS), product of a given demand growth forecast, is a clear and direct way to evaluate each one of the proposed expansion plans of the system. However, this aggregation methodology is not clear in explaining how to incorporate, in the expansion plan evaluation process, the technical and physical restrictions that make feasible the resulting networks.
How do the authors deal with these restrictions? As indicated in the paper, they have rejected the detailed geographical methodology, arguing it is not adequate for long term planning. However, one must be aware that distribution tariffs have a limited time validity, which for most regulations extends up to three to five years.
Tariff Design: The determination of the and coefficients considers a recursive bottom-up process, for the determination of the PEDS demand curve, beginning from the typical load curves of the low-voltage consumers. The contribution of each consumer to the PEDS, according to the article, is a result of a correlation that studies the impact of each consumer on the average costs in a given group of PEDS. The method considers a fixed network topology and the contribution of each consumer is prorated to each PEDS according to the correlation result. Did the authors consider the use of coincidence factors obtained from the real companies? The use of ratios could lead to lower average costs for the network expansion.
Information Asymmetries: One of the challenges of fixing distribution tariffs is to make the process immune to information asymmetries (i.e., independent from the information provided by the agents) It is not possible to regulate monopolies, and to define their tariffs, without information from the real firms. But the firms have the incentive to strategically manipulate the information they provide to achieve monopolistic prices. Therefore, we assign much importance to the way the adopted regulatory scheme handles these information asymmetries and subtracts and protects itself from their perverse influences.
The model-company yardstick regulation lends itself to more information independence than the price cap approach [4] , [5] . How does the method proposed by the authors perform in this aspect? How much can it be manipulated by the information provided by the distribution companies?
Open-Access Distribution Pricing: Building an open-access pricing scheme for distribution networks that is coherent with a tariff scheme for regulated consumers is a challenge. It is a growing need in systems that evolve from wholesale competition to retail competition, supplying nonregulated consumers and regulated ones through the same distribution wires [6] . How can this coherency be achieved through the proposed method?
Wire and Commercialization Business: Countries that have had benchmark regulation of the distribution business for many years, like Argentina and Chile, have looked at the separation of the wire business from the commercialization one as a means to introduce more competition in the market [6] . The authors are aware of this trend but it is not clear to the discussers how their pricing scheme would deal with this separation in the setting of the tariffs.
